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Abstract. In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets 
when firms are quantity setters. We consider a market for a homogeneous good 
with a special form of the demand function (ρ-linearity), constant returns to 
scale and identical firms. Marginal costs can take two values only: low or high. 
The regulator knows all parameters except marginal costs. Assuming that the 
regulator is risk neutral, we characterize the optimal policy and show how this 
policy depends on the basic parameter of demand and costs.   
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the main causes of market failure is lack of competition. Thus, a completely 
informed and benevolent regulator can find an allocation in which all agents are better 
off than under oligopolistic competition. A great deal of attention has been devoted to 
the case in which the regulator lacks information to implement efficient allocations and 
a single firm supplies the whole market (see the survey by Armstrong and Sappington 
(2005) and the references therein). In contrast, the case of regulation under oligopoly 
has been relatively neglected: All the papers we are aware of are generalizations of 
optimal regulatory schemes proposed for the case of monopoly: Shaffer (1989) and Kim 
and Chang (1993) generalized the work of Loeb and Magat (1979), Schwermer (1994) 
and Lee (1997) generalized the work of Sappington and Sibley (1988) and López-Cuñat 
(1995) generalized the work of Baron and Myerson (1982). 
In this paper we study the performance of a particular mechanism, price 
regulation, under oligopolistic competition and compare its welfare properties with 
those of oligopolistic competition, also referred to in the sequel as the free market. The 
motivation for our study is that price regulation is (or has been) used to regulate 
oligopolistic markets like gasoline, natural gas, electric power generation, 
telecommunications, health care, pharmaceuticals, etc. Again, the initial work in this 
problem was done in the case of a regulated monopoly, see Littlechild (1986). Price 
regulation is presented in textbooks as an inefficient mechanism under perfect 
competition. In this paper we attempt to bridge monopoly and perfect competition by 
considering the intermediate case, namely, oligopoly. We will see that, in some cases, 
price regulation is more efficient than the free market. 
In order to keep the story as simple as possible we assume a very stylized 
scenario which is presented in Section 2. The product is homogeneous. The unique 
consumer has a ρ-linear demand curve, which is a generalization of linear and isoelastic 
forms, see Anderson and Renault (2003), which is known by the regulator. The industry 
is composed of a fixed number of identical firms with constant marginal costs, i.e. we 
assume that costs are perfectly correlated (see Armstrong, Cowan and Vickrey (1994)). 
The assumption that firms are identical is useful for separating the problem of 
regulating a market where several firms have inefficient technologies from the problem 
of pure regulation of oligopoly. The marginal cost can take two values, high and low. 
The probabilities of occurrence of these two values are known by the risk-neutral 
regulator who maximizes expected social welfare. The free market is represented by 
Cournot equilibrium where firms know the true value of the marginal cost.  
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In Section 3, we show that the optimal policy is either the free market or a 
regulated price equal to one the two values of the marginal cost (Lemma 1). This is an 
interesting result from the normative point of view (i.e. how price regulation should be 
done) because it simplifies the task of maximizing expected social welfare. 
In sections 4 and 5 we study how the optimal policy depends on the underlying 
parameters. Instead of comparing expected social welfare under free market and 
regulation we compare percentages of welfare losses. This is because the percentage of 
welfare loss under the free market does not depend on both the marginal costs and the 
intercept of the demand function so the analysis is simplified greatly (Lemma 2).  
We show that the optimal policy depends on four variables: The number of 
firms, the parameter ρ of the demand function, the parameter β related with the ratio 
between high and low marginal costs and the parameter q which is the ratio of 
probabilities of occurrence of high versus low marginal costs. As we expect, the 
desirability of regulation decreases with the number of competitors, see Remark 1. Also 
for very small or very high values of q, regulation is the optimal policy because in this 
case the regulator faces very little uncertainty (Proposition 1). When the high and the 
low marginal costs are similar, so β is close to one, the optimal policy is to set a 
regulated price equal to the value of the large marginal cost. This is because this choice 
yields almost as much social welfare as the low marginal cost and avoids the risk that 
firms do not produce. Contrarily, when both marginal costs are sufficiently far apart, the 
optimal policy is to set a regulated price equal to the low value of the marginal cost 
because this option yields great social welfare. For intermediate values of β the free 
market may or may not be the optimal policy (Propositions 2 and 3). However β also 
depends on the intercept of the demand function. When this intercept is close to the high 
value of the marginal cost, the best policy is a regulated price equal to the low value of 
the marginal cost since, if costs are high, the loss is small. When the intercept is very 
large the best policy is a regulated price equal to the high value of the marginal cost in 
order to secure positive output whatever happens. Finally we study the shape of the 
optimal policy with respect to ρ. Unfortunately, in this case there is no clear cut result 
except for values of ρ close to zero or to infinite (Proposition 4). In the first case the 
optimal policy is to regulate with the regulated price equal to the low level of the 
marginal cost since demand is almost rigid. In the second case regulation is the optimal 
policy with the regulated price equal to the high value of the marginal cost since 
demand is very elastic. 
In Section 6 we tackle the case where the regulator, instead of setting a price sets 
a ceiling for the price, i.e., a price cap. We present a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the price caps to be equal to the regulated price considered before (Proposition 5). 
This condition implies that the variability of costs is not very large relatively to ρ and 
the number of firms. This condition does not look unreasonable in some instances. 
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 Our results can be used to judge the success (or lack of) of price regulation as 
done in practice. In particular they stress the importance of having a good estimate of 
the intercept of the demand function and ρ. Since these magnitudes cannot be discerned 
by looking at points around equilibrium, price regulation in practice might be more 
difficult than presented in this paper.  
Finally, section 6 gathers our final comments on the limitations of our work and 
mentions some possible extensions.  
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
There is a representative consumer with a utility function pxbxAxU −+−= + )1/(1 ρρ  
where x is aggregate output and p is the market price. We assume ρb  > 0 and 1−>ρ .2 
Maximization of utility yields an inverse demand function ρbxAp −= . Because αb  > 
0, p is decreasing on x. Notice that if ρ < 0, b < 0 and A = 0 we have an isoelastic 
demand function p = -bxρ and if ρ = 1 demand is linear. There are n identical firms 
producing a single output denoted by xi. Thus, ∑
=
=
n
i
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. Marginal costs are constant 
and denoted by c. Defining a = A - c, profits for firm i can be written as ( ) ii xbxaB −= . 
Assume ab > 0, which implies that positive outputs are possible. If firms are quantity 
setters, it is easy to check that second order conditions of profit maximization hold and 
that equilibrium is symmetric. Thus, first order conditions of profit maximization yield 
the Cournot equilibrium outputs and profits, denoted by the superscript c, namely.  
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Social welfare, denoted by W, is the sum of profits and the utility of the 
representative consumer, i.e.  
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Social welfare in the Cournot equilibrium, denoted by WC, is, 
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2 ρ must be larger than -1 because if ρ < -1 utility tends to minus infinite if x tends to zero. 
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In an optimal allocation, social welfare is maximized. Since the second order 
condition holds and the allocation is symmetric, the first order condition of social 
welfare maximization yields the optimal allocation, namely 
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Define the percentage of welfare loss, denoted by PWL, of an allocation 
yielding, say, social welfare W’, as follows: 
O
O
W
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The percentage of welfare loss under Cournot competition, denoted by PWLC, is 
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Plotting equation (3) for given n, it is seen that PWLC is non monotonic in ρ. It is 
easily seen that 0)()1(/
2121 <++−=
+−− ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρρ nndndPWLC  so PWLC is decreasing in n. 
 
 
3. REGULATION 
 
We assume that the regulator controls the market price. The regulator is uncertain of the 
value of marginal cost which can take two values: y with probability π  and z with 
probability π−1 . We will refer to these values as “states of the world”. Once the 
regulated price, p, is set, firms decide output. If p is smaller than the actual value of the 
marginal cost, firms do not produce and the social welfare is zero. If p is larger than or 
equal to the actual value of marginal cost, they produce an identical quantity each 
nxxi /=  that satisfies demand ( )ρ1/)( bpAx −= . Thus, social welfare in state c = y, z 
with regulated price p is 
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pAcxbxAxW R  if x > 0. WR = 0  otherwise. 
We assume that the regulator is risk neutral and maximizes expected social 
welfare. Firstly we show that the regulator chooses either p = y or p = z.  
 
Lemma 1. A regulator maximizing expected social welfare chooses a regulated price 
equal to y or to z.  
 
 6
Proof. Let U(x) be the utility function of the consumer and x(p) is demand at price p. 
Thus, if x > 0 social welfare can be written as W = U(x(p)) – cx(p). Differentiating the 
previous equation we easily see that if p > c social welfare is decreasing in p.  
Suppose that p > y. Expected social welfare can be increased by decreasing p so this 
price cannot be optimal. Suppose now that z < p < y. In this case, as before, a decrease 
in the regulated price has no effect on social welfare if c = y but it increases social 
welfare if c = z. Therefore, again a price decrease improves expected social welfare. 
Since the regulator will never choose a price below z, the lemma is proved.■ 
 
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is simple. The regulator wants prices to be as low 
as possible. However, if she chooses too low a price she risks that the industry will not 
produce at all. Thus, if the regulator chooses a price that is larger than y (resp. z) she 
bears as much risk of zero output as choosing p = y (resp. z) but if costs are y (resp. z) 
she is not doing as good as well as she can by setting the price equal to y (resp. z).   
Lemma 1 implies that the regulated price is either y or z. These two magnitudes 
are defined as follows:  
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The regulator chooses p = y if EWY > EWZ and p = z otherwise. The regulator is 
indifferent between both prices if EWY = EWZ. Define aH = A - z, aL = A – y and 
LH aa /=β . Notice that β > 1 if ρ > 0 and 0 < β < 1 if ρ < 0 (the case of β = 1, namely 
y = z, is trivial and it is not considered). With this notation in hand, EWY = EWZ can be 
written as ( )( ) ( ) ρρβπρβρβππρ +−=+−−+ 1111 . Defining ππ −= 1/q , the regulator is 
indifferent between setting the price at y or at z if and only if 
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4. COMPARING THE FREE MARKET AND REGULATION 
 
In order to compare the expected welfare under free market (e. g., Cournot competition) 
and in the social optimum we will find it more convenient to work in terms of 
percentages of welfare losses. As we will see, this greatly simplifies our analysis.   
From equations (4) and (5) we calculate the percentage of the expected welfare 
losses from price regulation. The optimal expected welfare, denoted by EW0, is the 
expected social welfare obtained if for each state of the world, the planner had complete 
information, i.e. when c = y (resp. c = z) the regulated price would be y (resp. z). Thus, 
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Next, we notice that the percentage of expected welfare losses from Cournot 
equilibrium equals the percentage of welfare losses obtained in (3) above. The intuition 
behind this result is that the parameter a, which encapsulates all the uncertainties faced 
by the regulator, enters multiplicatively the welfare both at Cournot and the optimal 
allocation (see equations (2) and (2’)). Consequently, a cancels out in the formula of the  
welfare losses  percentage which does not depend on the state of the world. We record 
this result as Lemma 2 below. 
 
Lemma 2. The percentage of expected welfare loss under Cournot competition equals 
the percentage of welfare loss.  
 
The proof is left for the reader. From now on and abusing notation we will denote 
the percentage of expected welfare loss under Cournot competition by PWLC. We are 
now ready to compare free market and price regulation. 
1) Consider first that the regulator chooses p = y. We will compare the percentage of 
welfare losses from price regulation when p = y, denoted by PWLY, with the welfare 
losses under Cournot competition.  
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PWLY (●) is increasing in ρ and β  if ρ > 0 (decreasing if ρ < 0) and decreasing in q (see 
Appendix). Comparing (8) with the welfare losses under Cournot equilibrium, easy 
calculations show that YC PWLPWL =  iff 
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2) Now consider that the regulator chooses p = z. The expected welfare is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρπ
ρ
ρπ
+
+
−=+
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= HZ a
b
zA
b
zAEW                  (10) 
 
The percentage of welfare losses from price regulation when p = z, denoted by PWLZ is 
 
( )
( )
).,,(
1
11 111
1
qPWL
q
q
aa
aPWL Z
HL
HZ βρ
βππ
π
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
=
+
=
−+
−−= +++
+
                (11) 
       
ZPWL  is decreasing in β  if 0>ρ  (increasing if 0<ρ ), increasing in ρ if ρ > 0 
(decreasing if 0<ρ ) and increasing in q. Similar to case 1) above, the value of q 
equalizing welfare losses under regulation with p = z and Cournot equilibrium, is 
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Notice that when β tends to 1, PWLY tends to zero but PWLZ tends to q/(q+1). 
The reason for that is the existence of a discontinuity: if the state of the world is y but the 
regulator set z there is no production so the welfare loss is positive even for y؄z. 
However, if the regulator set y the welfare loss tends to zero when y tends to z. 
Summing up, our main insight in this section is that, in order to find the optimal 
policy, a regulator has to look at three equations only, namely (3), (8) and (11). 
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5. THE OPTIMAL POLICY: COMPARATIVE STATICS 
 
In this section we characterize the values of ρ, β, n and q for which regulation or the free 
market are the optimal choices. We have two kinds of results: results that do not depend 
on the sign of α and results that depend on this sign.3 In the first class we have the 
characterization of the optimal policy when n and q vary. In the second class we have 
the characterization of the optimal policy when α and β vary. Firstly, we notice the 
following remark: 
 
Remark 1. Given ρ, β, and q there is a n1 such that if n א (1, n1] the optimal policy is 
regulation (either with p = z or with p = y). If  n > n1 the optimal policy is free market. 
 
The remark follows from the fact that, as we remarked after equation (3), the 
welfare loss under Cournot competition decreases with n and tends to zero when n tends 
to infinite, and that the expected welfare loss under regulation does not depend on n. 
This remark is just a re-statement of the well known fact that under identical firms with 
no economies of scale, the more competition in the market, the better. Clearly, when n1 
is 1, the interval (1, n1] is empty and free market is always the optimal policy. 
Now we turn to the study of the optimal policy when q varies. For given values 
of n, ρ and β denote by q1 the value of q in equation (6). Similarly, define q2 and q3 as 
the values of q at equations (9) and (12) respectively.  
 
Proposition 1. Let ρ, β, and n be given. Suppose that q2 ≥ q3. If q א (0, q3], the optimal 
policy is regulation with p = z. If q א [q3, q2], the optimal policy is free market. If q א 
                                                 
3 Recall that when α > 0 the demand function is concave or convex depending on α being larger or 
smaller than one, respectively. When α < 0 the demand function is convex. 
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[q2, ∞) the optimal policy is regulation with p = y. Suppose that q2 < q3. If q א (0, q1], 
the optimal policy is regulation with p = z. If q א [q1, ∞) the optimal policy is regulation 
with p = y. 
 
Proof. Notice the following facts: 
a) PWLY(ρ, β, ●) is decreasing in q and tends to zero when q tends to infinite. 
b) PWLZ PWLZ (ρ, β, ●) is increasing in q, tends to zero when q tends to zero 
and tends to one when q tends to infinite. 
c) PWLC is larger than zero and does not depend on β. 
Notice that a) and b) above imply that q1 and q3 exist. Then, the proposition 
follows from a), b) and c) by noticing that the values of q are defined by the 
equality between PWL at regulated prices y or z and the Cournot equilibrium. ■ 
 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. When q is small enough, the optimal 
policy is regulation with p = z because the probability of c = z is very large so the 
welfare loss of regulation is negligible because the case c = y, seldom occurs (PWLZ is 
close to zero). When q increases, on the one hand, PWLZ increases because the 
probability of c = y increases (in this case there is no production), and on the other hand 
PWLY decreases for the same reason. Thus for the intermediate value theorem there is a 
value of q (q1) for which PWLZ = PWLY. If for q1, PWLY < PWLC regulation is always 
better because PWLY is decreasing in q and tends to zero when q tends to infinite. 
Contrarily, if for q1, PWLY > PWLC , there is an interval [q2, q3] where free market is the 
optimal policy. 
We now turn our attention to the shape of the optimal policy when β or ρ vary. In 
this case we have to consider two cases: when ρ is positive and β lies between one and 
infinite and when ρ is negative and β lies between zero and one.  
Take ρ and q as given. Let β1 be the value of β solving PWLY(ρ, β, q) = PWLZ (ρ, β, 
q), i.e. it solves equation (6). Let β2 be the value of β solving PWLC (ρ, n) = PWLY(ρ, β, 
q)), i.e. it solves equation (9). β1 and β2 exist and are unique (see the proof of the next 
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proposition). Let β3 be the value of β that solves PWLC (ρ, n) = PWLY, (ρ, β, q) i.e. it 
solves equation (12). If such a value exists it is unique. If this value does not exists set β3 
= 1 (the lower bound for β). Now we are prepared to prove our next result. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that ρ > 0, n and q are given. Suppose that β3 > β2. If β א (1, β 2] 
the optimal policy is regulation with p = y. If β א [β 2, β 3], the optimal policy is free 
market. If β א [β3, ∞), the optimal policy is regulation with p = z. Suppose that β2 > β3. If  
β א (1, β1], the optimal policy is regulation with p = y. If β א [β1, ∞), the optimal policy 
is regulation with p = z. 
Proof. Notice the following facts: 
d) PWLY tends to zero if β tends to one. PWLY(ρ, ●, q) is increasing on β and 
tends to one if β tends to infinite. 
e) PWLZ tends to q/(q+1) if β tends to one. PWLZ(ρ, ●, q) is decreasing on β 
and tends to zero if β tends to infinite. 
f) PWLC does not depend on β. 
Notice that a) and b) above imply that β1 and β2 exist. The proposition then 
follows from a), b) and c) by noticing that the values of β are defined by the 
equalities between PWL at regulated prices y or z and the Cournot equilibrium. ■ 
 
The intuition of Proposition 2 is as follows. When β is close to 1, regulation is 
better than free market because the regulator faces very little uncertainty since y and 
z are almost identical so the expected welfare loss of regulation tends to zero. In this 
case the regulator sets p = y, because the welfare loss of setting y when costs are z is 
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very small compared with the loss of setting z when the cost is y (in the later firms 
will not produce). When β is large enough, regulation is better with p = z because 
when y tends to A, the surplus of setting a regulated price of y tends to zero so the 
welfare loss when p = z and c = y is very small. Thus for the intermediate value 
theorem there is a value of β (β1) for which PWLZ = PWLY. If for β1 PWLY < PWLC, 
regulation is always better because PWLZ is decreasing in β and tends to zero when 
β tends to infinite. Contrarily if for β1 PWLZ > PWLC, there is an interval [β2, β3] 
where free market is the optimal policy. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that ρ א (-1, 0), n and q are given. Suppose that β2 > β3. If β א 
(0, β 3], the optimal policy is regulation with p = z. If β א [β3, β2], the optimal policy is 
free market. If β א [β2, 1), the optimal policy is regulation with p = y. Suppose that β3 > 
β2. If β א (0, β1], the optimal policy is regulation with p = z. If β א [β1, 1), the optimal 
policy is regulation with p = y. 
 
Proof. Notice the following facts 
a) PWLY tends to zero if β tends to one. PWLY(ρ, ●, q) is decreasing on β and 
tends to one if β tends to zero. 
b) PWLZ tends to q/(q+1) if β tends to one. PWLZ(ρ, ●, q) is increasing on β 
and tends to zero if β tends to zero. 
c) PWLC does not depend on β. 
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The proposition follows from a), b) and c) by noticing that the values of β are 
defined by the equalities between PWL at regulated prices y or z and the Cournot 
equilibrium. ■ 
 
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. When β is small enough regulation is 
better with p = z, because the surplus when c = z is very large and the welfare loss when 
p = y is relatively negligible. When β is large enough regulation with p = y is the 
optimal policy because y is close to z and the welfare loss when c = z is very small. On 
the contrary, if p = z, the welfare loss of c = y can be very large because there is no 
production. When β increases, PWLZ increases and PWLY decreases so there is a value of 
β (β1) for which PWLZ = PWLY. If for β1 PWLY < PWLC, regulation is always better. 
Contrarily, if for β1 PWLY > PWLC, there is room for free market. 
Propositions 2 and 3 say two things: Firstly, when y and z are almost identical -so 
β is close to 1- regulation with price equals y (i.e. the safe option because it secures a 
positive output, no matter what) is the optimal choice. Secondly, when y and z are very 
different –so β is very large when ρ is positive and β is close to zero when ρ is negative- 
regulation with price equals z (i.e. the risky option) is the optimal choice given the large 
social welfare that is created in this case. However, the relationship between β and the 
marginal costs is not straightforward because β also depends on A. Thus fix y and z such 
that z/y is low. Firstly consider the case in which ρ is positive and A is positive but close 
to y. Thus, β is large and the optimal choice is a regulated price of z because the social 
welfare obtained when marginal costs are y is small. Secondly, consider the case in 
which ρ is negative and A is zero. Because z/y is low, β is low and the optimal choice is a 
regulated price of y because the social welfare that would be lost if price were z and the 
state of the world were y would be large. Thus the same values of the marginal costs are 
associated with very different policies. 
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 imply that when β or q are small or large enough, 
regulation is always the optimal policy. This is very intuitive because in these cases the 
uncertainty faced by the regulator disappears. Notice that, when ρ < 0 a price equal to y 
is optimal for values of β close to 1 (which is the largest value of β) and that when ρ > 0 
this price is also optimal when β is close to 1 (which is the smallest value of β).  
Finally we consider variations of ρ. This case is more complicated than the 
previous ones because PWLC depends on ρ. Consequently, our conclusions are not as 
sharp as in previous results. 
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Proposition 4. Suppose that β, n and q are given and that ρ > 0. For ρ close enough to 0 
the optimal policy is regulation with p = z. When ρ tends to infinite the optimal policy is 
regulation with p = y. 
 
Proof. Notice the followings facts. 
a) PWLC is positive when ρ → 0. PWLC(●, n) is quasi-concave with a maximum 
and decreasing when α is large enough. When ρ = 1, PWLC > 0 and when ρ 
→ ∞, PWLC  → 0.4 
b) PWLZ(●, β, q) is increasing with ρ. PWLZ → 0 if ρ → 0. 
c) PWLY(●, β, q) is decreasing in ρ, PWLY → 1 if ρ → 0. 
From (a), (b) and (c) the proposition follows noticing that it can be shown that when 
ρ→∞, lim PWLY/PWLC = 0.■ 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that when ρ is close to zero, the demand 
function is very elastic, so the welfare gains in the state of the world c = z are very large 
with respect to the welfare gains when the state of the world is c = y. Hence the 
optimality of setting the regulated price at z. When ρ is close to infinite, the demand 
function is almost rigid so setting the regulated price at z risks a lot of welfare gains if 
the state of the world is y. Moreover, in this case (even when the state of the world is z) 
the price under free market tends to A and welfare losses are larger with free market than 
with regulation with p = y. 
Notice that Proposition 4 does not characterize the optimal policy for intermediate 
values of ρ. However, something can be said about this case: For instance if q is small 
enough, Proposition 1 implies that free market is never optimal. When n is large enough, 
it can be shown that the slope of PWLC(●, β, q) is almost zero so there is a single value 
of ρ for which PWLC equals PWLY and PWLZ. Thus, the intervals for which the optimal 
policy is regulation with p = y, free market or regulation with p = z follow each other in 
this order. 
Finally, very little can be said when ρ is negative. It can be easily shown that PWLZ 
(β, ●, q)→ 0 if ρ → 0 but the limits of PWLY and PWLC are not zero, so regulation with p 
= z is the optimal policy. The reason is that demand is very elastic. This is different from 
the result in Proposition 4 above because there β was larger than one and in this case β is 
between zero and one. When ρ tends to -1, the welfare loss of price regulation with p = y 
and free market tend to zero but the welfare loss of price regulation with p = z tends to 
q/(q + 1). Thus the latter cannot be optimal. Depending on the parameters, the optimal 
policy could be regulation with p = y or free market. For instance, when β = 0.4, q = 0.1 
and n = 10, free market is optimal. The reason is that marginal costs are far apart, the 
                                                 
4 See Anderson-Renault (2003), p. 262. 
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probability of occurrence of y is small and competition is high. When β = 0.9, q = 10 
and n = 2, regulation is optimal. The reason is that marginal costs are close, the 
probability of occurrence of y is large and competition is between two firms only. 
 
 
6. PRICE CAPS 
 
In many practical applications, the regulator, instead of setting a price, sets a price cap, 
i.e. a ceiling for the price.5 In our case this means that, once the regulated price has been 
set, say to c, the regulator would allow for any increase in output starting from p-1 (c)/n. 
We will see that under an additional (and not unreasonable) condition, price caps 
coincide with regulated prices.  
 
Proposition 5. The price arising from a price cap coincides with the optimal regulated 
price for all states of the world iff the following inequalities hold 
If ρ > 0, β ≤ (ρ + n)/n. 
If ρ < 0, β ≥ (ρ + n)/n. 
 
Proof. Firstly suppose that the regulated price is z. If the state of the world is y, 
production is zero and no firm has incentives to increase production because costs are 
never recovered for any positive output. If the state of the world is z and a firm increases 
output it will face losses. 
Secondly, suppose that the regulated price is y. If the state of the world is y, 
again, if a firm increases output it will face losses. So we are left with the case in which 
the state is z. Let us write the price in the Cournot equilibrium when marginal costs are c 
= y, z as pC(c). Easy calculations show that  
.)( ρ
ρ
+
+=
n
cnAcpC                                                                                                     (13) 
Notice that pC(●) is increasing in c. Thus if pC(z) > y the price cap is always 
binding. But if pC(z) < y and the regulator sets a price of y, firms might be interested in 
increasing the output until they reach the Cournot equilibrium.  
Let x(y) be the output that results from setting p = y, i.e. x(y) = p-1(y). If starting 
from a price y, a single firm infinitesimally increases the output, the resultant change in 
profits will be along the inverse demand function and it amounts to 
.)())((
n
yx
dx
yxdpzy +−                                                                                             (14) 
                                                 
5 An analysis of the investment incentives under price caps and other market mechanisms is done by 
Fabra, Fehr and Frutos (2009). 
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Taking into account the first order condition of profit maximization in a Cournot 
equilibrium when the state of the world is z, equation (14) can be written as  
.)()()())((
n
x
dx
xdpzp
n
yx
dx
yxdpy
CC
C −−+                                                                  (15) 
Consider the following function: Ψ(x) ≡ dp(x)/dx (x/n) + p(x). It is easily seen 
that 
 .0)()1()()( <++=Ψ
dx
xdp
n
x
dx
xdp
dx
xd ρ                                                             (16) 
Combining equations (15) and (16), we see that an infinitesimal increase in the 
output of a single firm increases the profits for this firm so the situation where the price 
equals the regulated value is no longer an equilibrium. Since profit functions are 
concave, these infinitesimal variations are all we have to consider. 
In order to finish the proof, notice that pC(z) < y arises iff aL(ρ + n) < aHn. If ρ > 0 
this inequality is equivalent to β > (ρ + n)/n. If ρ < 0, this inequality is equivalent to β < 
(ρ + n)/n. ■ 
 
Proposition 5 says that if costs do not display too much variability, firms will not 
take the opportunity to increase the output when the regulated price is y and the state of 
the world is z. This is because costs are not sufficiently far apart to justify an increase in 
output. Proposition 5 suggests that this case arises under not unreasonable assumptions. 
For instance assume that there are four firms in the market. If demand is linear, β should 
be smaller than (n+1)/n. This implies that the variability in costs must be less than 25%. 
When demand is isoelastic, with, say, elasticity of 1.5, ρ equals .66. This implies that the 
variability of costs must be less than 16.66%. Both numbers do not seem far fetched 
even though further research on this issue is necessary. 
 
 
7. EXTENSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS 
 
In this paper we have studied, in a very simple framework, the optimal regulatory policy 
in an oligopolistic market where marginal costs are unknown to the regulator. There are 
many aspects of paramount practical importance that are left out of our study because 
they would require a fresh modelling, i.e. quality of the product, repeated interaction 
among firms and the regulator, different objectives for the regulator (i.e. pro-consumer 
or pro-firms) or variability of the demand.6 Other aspects could be incorporated or, at 
least, discussed in our framework like the three points considered below. 
 
1: Many marginal costs.  
                                                 
6 For the latter case see Earle, Schmedders and Tatur (2009).  
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In this case, it is easy to see that our Lemma 1 can be generalized to: “The regulator 
should never set a price different from a possible value of the marginal cost”. The proof 
is just identical, for any price between two values of the marginal cost, apply the proof in 
the main text. Of course the formulae showing welfare losses of regulated prices are less 
transparent but the general principle applies: an expected social welfare maximizing 
regulator only considers as an optimal choice either marginal costs or the free market 
price to be an optimal choice. This may be called the generalized “price equals marginal 
costs” principle. See more on this in Point 2 below. 
 
2. Non-constant average costs.  
Some of the markets in which price regulation has been used are characterized by large 
fixed costs (electricity, hospitals, etc.). Our paper can be interpreted as a model where 
fixed costs are known to the regulator and they are financed by non-distortionary 
taxation. The consideration of Ramsey pricing (i.e. price equals average costs) would 
require different calculations, even though the principles established in this paper still 
apply. Next, let us consider increasing marginal costs. Let ρ = b = 1, n = 1 and costs are 
cx2/2 with c = y, z. We will assume that once the price has been set by the regulator, 
firms are free of supplying whatever quantity they find more convenient.7 This implies 
that the monopolist supplies at price equals marginal costs unless this quantity exceeds 
the one that can be sold in the market at the regulated price. Consider regulation at price 
equals marginal costs if the true state is y. If the regulator decreases this price slightly we 
have two effects. On the one hand if the state is y the output and social welfare decrease 
(following the “price equals marginal cost” rule). On the other hand if the state is z 
output and social welfare increase following the expansion of demand. By differentiating 
expected welfare and setting this to zero, we get that the optimal price is 
.
)1)(1(1
1
z
y
y
y
A
p
+−++
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+
=
ππ
ππ
                                                    (??) 
Notice that when π = 0 (resp. 1), the regulated price is A/(1+z) (resp. A/(1+y)), which 
results from equalizing price to the marginal cost under state z (resp. y). The general 
principle would be that besides price equals marginal costs there are other prices that 
might be optimal for the regulator because they are a good compromise between 
different states of the world. 
 
3: Other forms of demand. 
                                                 
7 Under constant returns to scale, if price equals marginal cost, the firm is indifferent among any output as 
long as it is sold in the market. Therefore, the implicit assumption in our previous analysis is that the 
regulator can choose from any output from those in which the firm is indifferent. When marginal costs are 
increasing we have to be specific about the behaviour of firms. 
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There are cases in which the percentage of welfare losses under free market depends on 
the state of the world. In this case, the comparative static results will not be as clean as 
those case presented in this paper. Assume that the utility function of the representative 
consumer is cubic, written as Ax – bx² – d x³ – px. Thus, p = A – 2bx – 3dx² (see 
McHardy, (2000)). As in the main text set a ≡ A - c. The optimal and the free market 
output are respectively 
d
adbbxO
3
32 ++−=   and  
n
d
n
aad
n
b
n
b
xC 63
63)11()11( 22
+
+++++−
= .                (??) 
Setting b = d = n = 1 by simplicity, we see that if a tends to zero PWLC tends to 0.111 
and if a tends to infinite, PWLC tends to 0.116. Thus, in this case PWLC depends on a. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 1) PWLY (●, ρ, q) is increasing in β if ρ > 0 and decreasing if -1 <ρ <0. 
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Notice that if ρ > 0, β > 1; if ρ < 0, 0 < β <1, and 1
1
>ρβ always. 
 
2)  PWLY (β, ●, q) is increasing in ρ if ρ > 0 and decreasing if -1 < ρ < 0. 
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If ρ > 0 (resp.< 0), this expression is negative: both parenthesis in the numerator are 
positive (resp. negative), because they are increasing in β and tend to zero if β→1. 
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